The UK already uses price as a public-health tool.
The Soft Drinks Industry Levy has applied since 2018. Its stated purpose is not simply to raise money: the government says it supports efforts to tackle obesity by encouraging manufacturers to reduce added sugar in soft drinks.
That policy is now being strengthened. From 1 January 2028, the amount of added sugar at which a drink becomes liable for the levy will fall from 5g to 4.5g per 100ml. Existing exemptions for milk-based and milk-substitute drinks with added sugar will also be removed.
The government expects manufacturers to respond by reformulating products. It estimates that, after allowing for that reformulation, only another 4% of soft-drink sales will actually pay the levy as a result of the changes.
So the principle is already established:
Change the price incentive and companies and consumers may change their behaviour.
That leads to the other half of the question.
If government is prepared to use price to discourage products associated with poorer health, what happens if it also uses price to make healthier food cheaper?
The other half of the price equation
This is not an unusual public-health proposal.
The World Health Organization’s 2024 guidance on fiscal policies for healthy diets covers both taxation and subsidies. It includes taxes on foods and drinks that contribute to unhealthy diets alongside subsidies intended to reduce the retail price of healthier foods.
WHO’s review of 301 publications found that most modelling studies examining taxes on sugar-sweetened drinks or less healthy foods and subsidies on healthier foods found them to be cost-effective or cost-saving.
Britain already does some of this indirectly.
Most food for human consumption is zero-rated for VAT, while categories including confectionery, crisps, ice cream and soft drinks are generally charged at the standard rate.
But this is not a modern nutritional pricing system.
The VAT rules produce some peculiar distinctions. Cakes are normally zero-rated. Chocolate-coated biscuits are standard-rated. A chilled ready meal can be zero-rated. Soft drinks are generally standard-rated.
HMRC’s own history shows that these food classifications have evolved through decades of tax legislation since VAT was introduced, rather than being built as a modern nutrient-profile system.
Government now has something much closer to such a system.
The UK’s Nutrient Profiling Model assesses foods using beneficial and less beneficial nutritional components and is used to identify “less healthy” products for restrictions. An updated model was published in January 2026, although it has not yet been applied to policy.
So defining which foods should be targeted is difficult, but it is not a problem government has never encountered.
Where are the equivalent price reductions?
There are schemes that help some people buy healthier food.
Healthy Start helps eligible pregnant people and families with children under four buy products including fruit, vegetables and pulses. Eligibility is restricted and generally depends on qualifying benefits, although some other groups can also qualify.
That is targeted support rather than a general mechanism for reducing healthy-food prices.
The government’s wider approach is also moving towards changing what supermarkets sell. Its Healthier Food Targets and Reporting policy is being developed to measure the healthiness of sales by large food businesses and support future targets.
The government has previously suggested that retailers might improve healthier sales through measures including reformulation, changing shop layouts, loyalty schemes and discounts on healthy foods.
That means government already accepts that lower prices can be part of the solution.
But that leaves a larger fiscal question unanswered:
Has government examined systematically using revenue raised by health-related food and drink measures to reduce the retail price of healthier food?
The NHS is on the other side of the till
This matters because the cost of food does not end at the supermarket checkout.
Government public-health guidance says a healthy, balanced diet can reduce the risk of cardiovascular disease, type 2 diabetes and some cancers.
The government’s food strategy estimates that obesity-related ill health alone costs the NHS more than £11.4 billion a year.
That creates an obvious connection between food policy and healthcare spending.
A measure that makes healthier diets more affordable has an immediate cost.
Any resulting NHS saving may appear gradually, years later and in another departmental budget.
That does not prove government prefers revenue-raising measures to prevention.
But it does create an accounting problem worth examining.
Consider how the new Soft Drinks Industry Levy changes are presented.
The government has published an Exchequer forecast. Its November 2025 consultation response said the changes were expected to raise £40 million a year in additional tax receipts after their introduction.
Existing SDIL receipts are substantial too: HMRC recorded provisional receipts of £327 million in 2024–25.
Government therefore knows how to calculate one side of the equation very precisely.
The question is whether it has done comparable work on the other.
What happens if the money goes the other way?
Suppose part of the revenue raised through health-related food and drink measures was used specifically to reduce the retail price of selected healthier staples.
What would £100 million spent that way do?
Would people buy more fruit and vegetables?
Would the effect be greatest among households where price matters most?
What would happen to rates of diet-related ill health?
And eventually, what would happen to NHS spending?
These are questions government can model.
WHO’s evidence suggests they are worth asking.
There are legitimate complications.
Retailers could absorb some of a subsidy rather than passing it on. Consumers might spend the saving elsewhere. Poorly chosen nutritional thresholds could create strange incentives for manufacturers. Some subsidies might cost considerably more than the healthcare expenditure they prevent.
None of that justifies assuming the policy would work.
It just means it needs to be tested properly.
The questions TWIS wants answered
TWIS wants to know:
- Has HM Treasury, the Department of Health and Social Care, the Office for Health Improvement and Disparities or NHS England modelled reducing the retail price of healthier foods as a population-level health intervention?
- Has government directly compared healthier-food subsidies with taxes or levies on less healthy products?
- Has it calculated the likely effect of those subsidies on future NHS expenditure?
- Has it considered explicitly recycling revenue from health-related food and drink measures into lower prices for healthier foods?
- If that approach has been considered and rejected, what evidence supported the decision?
Britain already uses food prices on the basis that they can affect behaviour.
It already uses taxes, levies, VAT treatment, promotion restrictions and nutrient profiling to influence parts of the food market.
It also pays billions through the NHS for illnesses in which diet plays a part.
So the question is no longer simply whether government should make unhealthy choices more expensive.
It is whether it has properly calculated the value of doing the opposite as well.
If price can discourage the choices government wants us to make less often, how much could Britain save by making the choices it wants us to make more often cheaper?
If government has already done that calculation, it should publish it.
If it has not, that may be the more important story.